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Abstract 
In the US, FASB NR 2 demands the full expensing of R&D costs because they would not contribute to future 
earnings.  In Europe, however, article 37  of the Fourth European Directive allows companies to  capitalize 
their costs of R&D as  an intangible asset or to  expense them immediately in their income statement. The 
paper exploits this difference and tries to  analyze empirically which factors determine the reporting choice 
made by firms in Europe. 
More specifically, we analyze the capitalization as well as  the disclosure decision of 321  Flemish 
firms, who are actively performing R&D activities.  Company information from their financial statements is 
combined with privately held data on the size and nature of their R&D-activities.  The disclosure decision is 
analyzed separately from the capitalization decision.  Only 30 % of the 321 R&D active firms in the sample 
disclosed the amount of R&D spent in their financial  statements.  About 70 %  of those firms  disclosing 
choose to capitalize. 
The empirical results show that the disclosure decision is determined by the R&D characteristics as 
well as by the financial performance of the firm.  The probability that a firm discloses its R&D-expenses is 
increasing with its R&D intensity, the existence of an R&D-department and cooperation with universities or 
other firms.  The current as  well as  the long term financial performance are also relevant for the disclosure 
decision. Once the firm has decided to disclose its R&D-expenses, the decision to capitalize these expenses is 
mainly determined by the financial performance. If firms can not repay part of their debt and if stakeholders 
do not receive a sufficiently high income, firms are more likely to capitalize their R&D costs. When the group 
of capitalizing firms  is  compared to  the group of expensing firms,  whether disclosing or not,  our results 
suggest  that  the  R&D  intensity,  at  least  in  highly  innovative  industries,  and  the  financial  performance 
determine the  capitalization of R&D expenses.  Our results  suggest that the expenses of successful R&D 
activities are more likely to be capitalized as an asset in the balance sheet. 
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1. Introduction 
Article 37  of the Fourth European Directive and article 25  of the Belgian accounting law allow 
companies to capitalize their costs of research and development (R&D) as an intangible asset and 
amortize these costs over future years or to expense them immediately in their income statement. 
This flexibility contrasts with the situation in the US where a decision of the FASB in 1974 (FASB 
NR 2) requires the full expensing of R&D outlays in financial reports of public corporations. This 
difference in  approach underlines  the  importance of the  ongoing discussion on  whether or not 
capitalization of R&D spending should be allowed (Perry et al. (1994), Lev et al (1996)). 
There are basically two kinds of arguments why firms should be allowed to capitalize their 
R&D-expenditures. First, there exists evidence for the fact that US firms, who are not allowed to 
capitalize,  adjust their R&D-expenditures  to  help  achieve  budget  targets  (Perry  et al.  (1994)). 
Since R&D  is  a critical factor  for  the  competitiveness  of an  industry,  this  may  well  limit the 
innovative capacity of an economy. Perry et al.  (1994) therefore conclude that accounting standard 
setters should allow the capitalization of R&D assets  1. 
Second,  the  "true and fair  view"  of the  financial  statements  would  be  better served if 
capitalization is allowed. The evidence presented in Lev et al. (1996) for example indicates that the 
correlation  between R&D-expenditures  and  earnings  in  subsequent  years  is,  in  general,  both 
statistically significant and economically meaningful. On average, a one dollar increase in R&D-
expenses leads to a two dollar increase in profit over a seven-year period and a five dollar increase 
in market value.  The average duration of R&D-benefits is 6 to 7 years, where the contribution of 
the current earnings is  highest for the one,  two and three year lagged R&D-expenditures. These 
findings contradict the presumed absence of a relation between R&D-expenditures and subsequent 
benefits on which the FASB restriction in the US is based. 
The  market  value  of R&D-in-process  is  also  relevant  to  capital  market  investors.  The 
positive and significant stock returns  and market-to-book values  following the  disclosure of the 
estimated fair value of R&D and technology-in-process are therefore another argument in favor of 
disclosing through capitalization (Deng et al. (1997)). 
In this paper we analyze the capitalization decision of more than 300 R&D-active Belgian, 
i.c.Flemish,  firms.  Analyzing  firms  which  have  the  flexibility  to  either capitalize  their  R&D-
expenditures or to expense them in their income statements may contribute to the ongoing debate 
in the US and other countries where firms don't have this flexibility. It allows to investigate which 
firms,  when given the option, will decide to capitalize these expenses. Moreover, we will not only 
look at the capitalization decision of these firms, but also at their disclosure decision. Before firms 
'This is not to say that if the capitalization of R&D costs were allowed, there would be no such problem since 
in that case not the R&D budgets but the amount capitalized could be used as a tool to smooth earnings. Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  2 
can capitalize their R&D-expenses, these need to be disclosed as  such in the income statements. 
R&D-performing firms have the option indeed not to disclose these expenditures, which implies of 
course that they  cannot  capitalize  them,  but  to  book them as  regular  expenses.  In the  scarce 
literature related to  the subject, no attention has  been paid to  this disclosure decision,  probably 
because the  idea was  that firms  which disclose their expenditures, do so in order to be able  to 
capitalize them.  In our sample however,  about 30 %  of the firms  which disclosed their R&D-
expenditures didn't capitalize these expenses. This finding  supports the idea that the disclosure 
decision needs to be analyzed separately. By disentangling the disclosure from the capitalization 
decision, we can find out whether or not the same factors drive both the capitalization as  well as 
the disclosure decision. 
We do  so  by combining data  from an  R&D-questionnaire  as  well  as  from the  income 
statements of 321  Flemish companies active in R&D. We try to explain why some of these firms 
prefer to disclose their R&D-expenses while others don't. A second question is  why some of the 
firms who disclose their R&D-expenses prefer to  capitalize these expenses while others expense 
them immediately. 
In what follows we first discuss the scarce literature related to this subject. Subsequently 
we give a brief description of the data used to explore the reporting decisions of R&D-performing 
firms. Next the results of a logit-model explaining both the disclosure and capitalization decision 
are reported. The results seem to support the idea that the disclosure decision is driven by both the 
R&D-characteristics as well as the financial situation of the firms while the capitalization decision 
is  mainly influenced  by  the  latter type  of variables.  Since the  topic,  despite its  importance,  is 
relatively unexplored, the paper by presenting some first results, hopes to incite further research. 
2. A Discussion of the Related Literature 
The disclosure  and  capitalization of R&D-spending  has  not been  extensively discussed  in  the 
literature.  While the  disclosure  decision  has  never been  distinguished  from  the  capitalization 
decision, the capitalization decision has been merely looked at in empirical work. In addition, only 
accounting variables are used to  distinguish between capitalization versus non-capitalization. An 
example is the work by Ball and his colleagues (Ball et al. (1991». In their survey for the UK they 
asked firms why they capitalize their R&D-expenditures. The most frequently given answers are: 
the  increased  fund  raising  ability,  the  influence on profits  and a  strong confidence in  the  real 
benefits  of R&D.  The  influence  on  the  fund  raising  ability  is  more  important  for  small  high 
technology firms  than for  large  firms.  Firms  expensing  their R&D-costs  do  so  for  reasons  of 
prudence and fear of external judgments. The paper by Daley et al.  (1983), using US  data from Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  3 
financial  statements  before  1974,  shows  that  firms  capitalizing  their R&D-expenses  are  more 
highly leveraged, use more public debt,  are closer to  dividend restrictions, and are smaller than 
firms which expensed R&D-costs. 
The choice of reporting methods is  mainly explained in the literature by the contracting 
and  the signalling theory as  well as  by  the income  smoothing hypothesis. Firms choose income 
increasing accounting methods, such as  linear depreciation, FIFO and the capitalization of R&D-
expenses, to avoid the violation of debt covenants. However, firms can also prefer to expense their 
R&D-costs to avoid too high reported profits (political visibility argument) or wage claims from 
the  employees  (Hagerman et al.  (1979),  Zmijewski  et al.  (1981),  Healy (1985),  Begley (1990), 
Watts  et al.  (1990),  Defond  et al.  (1994)).  The  reporting  choice can  also  be  used  as  a  signal 
(Spence (1973), Hughes et al.  (1988)). If firms want to convince investors and debt holders about 
the future success of their R&D-activities, they will show these costs as an intangible asset in their 
balance sheet. 
Finally, earnings' management can also influence reporting choices made. Asset write-offs 
can be done to reflect declines in the  value  of assets  or to  manipulate earnings. Francis et al. 
(1996)  show  that  the  second  motive  plays  a  substantial  role  in  explaining  the  write-offs  of 
discretionary items, such as goodwill and restructuring charges. In countries where R&D expenses 
can be capitalized, the amount of R&D capitalized and not the amount spent is probably a tool for 
earnings' management. 
But even if we take  into account the contracting as  well as  the  signalling literature, no 
attention has ever been paid to the disclosure decision nor to the influence of the specific nature of 
R&D-activities  on  the reporting decision made. Further, the  disclosure decision has  never been 
distinguished from the capitalization decision,  implicitly assuming that both decisions coincide. 
But at least for our sample of Flemish firms, which we will discuss in the next paragraph, it turned 
out that nearly lout of each 3 firms which disclosed its R&D-expenditures didn't capitalize these 
expenditures. So there seem to be quite a lot of firms  which disclose their R&D-expenditures for 
other reasons than to be able to capitalize these expenses. Who are these firms and why do they do 
so? One advantage of disclosure is the fact that it informs all stakeholders (shareholders, creditors, 
the government,  ... ) about the R&D-activities of the firm which may result in long term benefits 
making it easier to attract funds or to find suitable partners for know-how transfers. On the other 
hand,  also  competitors  receive this  information which may  imply a strategic  disadvantage if it 
induces competitors to pull up their R&D-commitments. 
The reporting choice of R&D performing firms may be influenced by the specific nature of 
R&D-activities. Firstly, given its highly risky nature, it is difficult to value R&D compared to other 
assets like for instance buildings and inventories. Secondly, different types of R&D-activities with 
a different visibility can be distinguished: research or development, process or product innovation, Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  4 
basic or applied research. Thirdly, the organization of the R&D-activities, influencing its visibility, 
like for instance the existence of a separate R&D-department or cooperation agreements with other 
firms  or research institutes, can also be important for  the reporting decision.  Finally, firms  can 
invest in R&D on a permanent basis or only occasionally. In what follows we  will therefore not 
only distinguish between the disclosure and the capitalization decision but we will also take into 
account in both decisions the information we have about the nature and organization of the R&D-
activities of the firms involved. 
3. The Sample 
The  study  uses  data  from  basically  2  sources,  the  combination  of which  offers  a  unique 
opportunity to  study the disclosure and capitalization decision. A first source are the results of a 
questionnaire which was organized by IWT to estimate the R&D-expenditures by private firms in 
Flanders in 1992 and  1993, as  part of Belgian statistical information required by the OECD. 321 
firms  reported  R&D- and/or  innovation  expenditures,  a  sample  biased  in  favor  of large  firms 
performing  R&D-activities  on  a  permanent  basis.  Besides  some  general  firm  characteristics 
(turnover, employment, ownership, NACE-sector, export intensity) and their R&D-expenditures as 
such, information was  also collected on the allocation of their R&D-expenses between research 
versus development activities or process  versus  product R&D, on how the R&D-activities  were 
financed (internal or external sources),  where they took place (intra versus extra muros)  and on 
their cooperative behavior regarding their R&D-activities2• 
This  firm  level  information  on  R&D-activities  for  1993  was  linked  to  the  financial 
statements of these firms. For every company the notes to their financial statements were checked 
to  verify,  first,  whether  or not  the  firms  which  were  all  engaged  in  R&D  during  this  period, 
disclosed their R&D-expenses and,  second,  whether or not they capitalized these expenses.  We 
were able to collect this information for 321 firms.  As indicated in Figure 1, about 70 % of these 
firms didn't disclose their R&D-expenses in their income statements. So a large majority of R&D-
performing firms in this sample did not identify in there income statements these expenses to be 
related to R&D. Consequently, they could not make use of the possibility to capitalize their R&D-
expenditures3•  Only 94 firms  or nearly 30 % disclosed their expenses. Of these 94 firms,  65  or 
2 For more details regarding the set-up of this questionnaire as  well a presentation and interpretation of the 
results, see Veugelers et al.  (1995) and Veugelers (1997). 
3 This figure of non-disclosures may be even higher for the population of R&D-performing firms. The reason 
is that the sample is biased, like we indicated before, in favour of large firms performing R&D-activities on a 
permanent basis. These firms, as we will show later on in the paper, have a higher probability to disclose and 
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69,1 %  capitalized  their  expenses,  while  the  other  29  firms  didn't.  The  latter firms  therefore 
disclosed their R&D-expenditures for other reasons than to be able to capitalize these expenses. 
Their number supports the idea that the disclosure decision deserves separate attention. 
The numbers in Figure 1 are different from those in Herrman and Thomas (1995). In their 
study on  the  harmonization of accounting measurement practices  in the European  Community, 
they reported that half of the firms disclosed information about their R&D-expenditures4• But only 
about  23  %  of the  firms  which  disclosed  their  R&D-expenses,  capitalized  them.  So  a  large 
majority of the disclosing companies record R&D-costs as  an expense in the income statements. 
When comparing the  different countries,  they note however that companies from Belgium and 
Portugal favor disclosing/capitalizing R&D-costs. 
For all these 321  firms,  additional financial  and accounting information was  withdrawn 
from their financial statements. These data were merged with the information about their R&D-
expenses and -profile. 
Figure 1: 





94 (29,3 %) 
Non disclosure 
227 (70,7 %) 
Capitalize 
65 (69,1 %) 
Expense 
29 (30,9 %) 
When formulating our hypotheses conceilling the disclosure and capitaiization behavior of R&D-
performing firms,  we  will distinguish between "accounting" and "R&D" variables.  "Accounting" 
variables  are  related  to  the financial  position of the firm  and already received attention in the 
empirical  literature  we  discussed  with  respect  to  the  capitalization  decision.  Ignored  in  this 
literature  are  the  "R&D"  variables  which  we  will  include  in  our analysis.  These  variables  are 
related  to  the  absolute  as  well  as  the  relative  importance  of the  R&D-activities  and  to  the 
organization of these activities. We expect these "R&D" variables to be important especially when 
analyzing the  disclosure decision. It should be stressed that we  will consider the  impact of the Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  6 
same set of variables when analyzing the disclosure as  well  as  the capitalization decision.  This 
allows  to  explicitly  identify  which  type  of factors  is  of greater  importance  in  explaining  the 
disclosure decision as opposed to the capitalization decision. 
4. 1. Financial peiformance 
Factors which are related to the financial  position of the firm may have an  impact on both the 
disclosure as well as  the capitalization decision in many different ways. In what follows we will 
pay attention to the potential impact of the performance of the firm and the incentive to smooth 
income. 
Related to the performance of the firm, research has been done on the relationship between 
the  type of private information and the  disclosure decision.  Research on management earnings' 
forecasts (Lev et al. (1990), Lang et al. (1993»  shows that firms are more likely to disclose private 
information  the  more  favorable  this  information.  But  according  to  Skinner  (1994),  earnings 
information is more likely to be released if the news is bad in order to reduce the probability of 
litigation. Whether a firm performs R&D-activities or not cannot be classified in terms of good 
versus  bad news.  But firms  which perform badly may want to  disclose their R&D-expenses  to 
explain their worse  performance to  their shareholders  and creditors.  By disclosing their R&D-
investments  they may  try to convince these stakeholders that the situation will  be better in the 
future when these R&D-investments payoff. Following the same type of reasoning, one might also 
expect firms which perform worse to capitalize more since the capitalization of R&D-expenses can 
be used as  an income increasing accounting method.  As  a consequence, we  can summarize the 
expected impact of the performance of the firm on the disclosure as  well as  on the capitalization 
decision as  follows:  firms  which perform badly are more  likely to  disclose and capitalize their 
R&D-expenses. 
In our empirical analysis  we  used  several  variables  to  measure  the  performance of the 
firms:  their current as well as their debt/equity ratio, their return on assets and on equity. We also 
introduced something like a short as  well  as  a long term performance measure. In the short run 
firms  do  not have  an  incentive to  disclose  when  the  stakeholders of the firm (debt and equity 
holders) receive a sufficiently high  income.  For the shareholders  we  assumed  that they will  be 
dissatisfied if their return on investment was less than 8%. While this cut-off criterion will always 
be arbitrarily to a certain extent, the idea is  that on top of a 3%  risk free  interest rate, investors 
4 Herrmann et al.  (1995) only considered large firms which may be an explanation for the higher percentage 
of firms  disclosing their R&D-expenses since large firms are more likely to disclose (see infra). Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  7 
want a risk premium of 5%5 . Creditors are assumed to be dissatisfied if debts can't be repaid. This 
is certainly the case if the operational cash flow of a firm (cash flow + changes in working capital) 
is negative6.7  In the analysis we  introduce this idea by the variable "stake". "Stake" refers to the 
situation of the stakeholders of the firm, more precisely the situation of the shareholder as well as 
of the creditors. This dummy-variable gets the value 0 if both parties are dissatisfied.The dummy 
gets 1 in all other circumstances. 
As  a  long  term  performance  measure  we  constructed  the  variable  "finhealth"  which 
represents the financial health of the firm from a long term perspective. It  is  a dummy variable 
which gets the value 1 if the sum of the equity of the firm and its long term debt is larger than its 
fixed assets. If this is the case, the firm is considered to be financially healthy. If the sum is smaller 
than its  fixed assets,  problems may  arise for the reimbursement of short term debts since fixed 
assets,  which are a long term engagement,  are partially financed  by  short term debt.  When the 
short term debt has to be repaid, the firm might be unable to do so because the cash from debt has 
been invested in long term assets. Losses from previous years as well as a decrease in the amount 
of equity are mostly responsible for this situation. 
Another hypothesis related to the financial situation of the firm is the income smoothing 
hypothesis.  There  exists  evidence  that  in  countries  where  the  capitalization  of assets  is  not 
allowed,  firms  smooth  their  income  by the  amount  of R&D-expenditures  (Grinaker and  Perry 
(1994)).  This  is  an  important  observation  since  if firms  cut  their  R&D-budgets  to  reach  the 
expected earnings, this may well limit the innovative capacity of an economy. If we find that the 
disclosure and the capitalization decision are influenced by the change in reported income, it could 
indicate that firms  use  the  amount capitalized and  not the  real  amount of R&D-expenses  as  a 
smoothing  instrument.  In Flanders  (but the  same  is  true  for  many  other countries  in  Europe), 
earnings' forecasts are not readily available. Therefore we constructed the variable "profgrowth", 
making  use  of the  previous  year's  earnings  as  expected  earnings  (corrected  for  the  amount 
capitalized and the depreciation costs of the R&D-expenses) which were subsequently subtracted 
from  the  current  year  earnings.  The  expected  impact  of this  variable  on  the  disclosure  and 
capitalization decision is  summarized as  follows:  when profits increase,  firms  are less  likely to 
disclose and capitalize their R&D-expenses. 
5 The results we will report later on in the paper are stable however for all returns on equity between 6 % and 
11  %. The average return on equity in the sample is 6.5%. 
6 Even if a firm cannot repay her debt which matures, the debtholders are more prepared to  negotiate a new 
repayment schedule when at least the interest charges can be paid. 
7 Another possibility was to assume that creditors won't be pleased with the performance of the firm if not all 
long  term debts  which  mature  can  be repaid.  However,  in  1993  interest  rates  were  low  and  decreasing. 
Therefore firms  preferred to  repay their long term debts and to  replace them with short term debts.  Under 
these circumstances, the introduction of the repayment capacity would result in an overestimation of firms in 
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4.2. R&D profile 
We now tum to a discussion of the impact of the R&D-profile of the firms involved in the sample 
on their disclosure and capitalization decision. The impact on the disclosure decision is discussed 
separately from the impact on the capitalization decision. 
With respect to the disclosure decision, the impact of the R&D-variables which we  will 
look at  can  be  stated  in  terms  of a  fundamental  trade-off which  exists  when  disclosing.  The 
advantage of disclosure is  the  fact  that it  informs  all  stakeholders  (shareholders,  creditors,  the 
government,  ... ) about the  R&D-activities  of the  firm  which  may result  in  long term benefits, 
through easier fund  raising or partner search.  On  the  other hand,  also competitors receive  this 
information.  The  Industrial  Organization literature  stresses  that  information on  commitment to 
R&D  activities  may  stimulate  or  discourage  R&D  spending  by  other  firms  in  the  industry 
depending on the strategic substitutability or complementarity between products and the size of 
spillovers, see De Bondt (1997).  When firms  are marketing substitute products and technology 
leakage can be minimized, competitors will limit own R&D when a firm can signal commitment to 
its own R&D.  In all other circumstances, competitors will pull up their R&D.  One could therefore 
expect that if it is important to inform stakeholders,  while circumstances are such that the strategic 
value of this information is limited and/or competitors know about the R&D-activities of the firm 
anyway, chances are higher that firms will disclose their R&D-expenses. On the other hand, when 
the disclosure of information would imply a strategic disadvantage while it is  less  important to 
inform stakeholders, disclosure is less likely. The idea of this trade-off can also be related with the 
concept of proprietary costs, as developed in Verrechia (1983)). A proprietary cost is any possible 
reduction  in  future  cash  flows  attributable  to  the  disclosure  decision  since  the  release  of 
information may be relevant to competitors or employees, who might raise their wage demands. 
This implies that firms are more likely to disclose when the proprietary costs of disclosure are low. 
This trade-off approach can be summarized as follows:  firms are more likely to disclose when the 
informative value of disclosure for the stakeholders is high while the strategic value of disclosure 
for competitors is low. 
We  used  a  number  of variables  to  draw  a  R&D-profile  of the  firms  in  our  sample, 
distinguishing between variables describing the absolute as well as the relative importance of their 
R&D-activities and variables which are related to the orientation and the organization of the R&D-
activities.  We expect that variables  which  indicate the  importance of the R&D-activities  to  the 
firm, have a positive impact on the probability of disclosure. Firms which spend a lot on R&D or 
employ a large number of R&D personnel, in absolute terms as well as in relative terms, are more Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  9 
likely to disclose these expenses since they need more funding and because competitors are more 
likely to know about their R&D-activities anyway. 
The  other  R&D-variables  included  in  our  analysis  are  related  to  the  way  the  R&D-
activities are financed,  whether they are research versus development oriented, whether they are 
process  versus  product  oriented,  where  they  take  place,  whether  or  not  they  take  place  III 
cooperation with other partners and whether or not the firm belongs to a R&D-intensive sector. 
With respect to  the way the R&D-activities are financed, we expect firms  which receive 
R&D-subsidies from the government to have a higher probability of disclosure. If a firm does not 
disclose its R&D-expenditures in the financial statements, the government has less information to 
track the record of good R&D performance of this firm,  which might decrease the probability of 
receiving grants in the future. 
If the expenditures are more research oriented, as  compared to  development,  one might 
expect the firms  to  be more likely to  disclose their expenditures since the competitive effect of 
disclosing research expenses is smaller than for development activities.  On the other hand,  as the 
revenues from development activities are more identifiable and can be realized in a shorter time 
period, the probability of capitalization (and therefore disclosure) is larger. 
R&D-activities which are oriented towards  the development of new processes will limit 
costs while the purpose of product oriented R&D is the development of new products. The benefits 
of new products are typically more identifiable than those of cost reductions. We therefore expect 
that the higher the amount of R&D-expenses for the development of new  products (processes), the 
higher (lower) the chance of disclosure. 
The outsourcing of R&D  is  an  observable  action  contrary  to  a  situation  where  a firm 
performs  its  R&D-activities  "intra muros".  Given  this  observability,  there  is  less  need  to  keep 
information proprietary. Therefore, the higher the percentage of R&D-expenditures which is spent 
"extra muros",  which  implies  of course a lower percentage spent  "intra muros",  the higher the 
chance of disclosure.  Similarly,  when a firm has  an R&D-department or is  involved in  a R&D-
cooperation agreement, we expect the probability of disclosure to be higher since these are more 
observable anyway and can be used as a signal to attract partners. 
A last related R&D-variable is  the  R&D-intensity  of a sector.  The R&D-intensity of a 
sector was measured by the amount of R&D-expenditures divided by sales at the sector level. The 
classification  of sectors  follows  Veugelers  et  al.  (1995).  High-tech  sectors  are  the  chemical 
industry (Nace 24), the food industry (Nace 15), the metal processing and electrotechnical industry 
(Nace  28,  29,  31,  34),  the  information  technology  industry (Nace  30,  32)  and  the  informatics 
industry (Nace nl  All other NACE-sectors are classified as  sectors with a low R&D-intensity. 
8  The firms  in  these highly R&D intensive sectors were responsible for  about 97  % of the R&D-expenses 
reported by all firms in the sample. Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  10 
We constructed the variable "R&Dint(H)" referring to the R&D-intensity of the firm if it belongs 
to an  industry classified as  highly R&D-intensive.  Similarly, the variable "R&Dint(L)" refers to 
the R&D-intensity of the firm if it belongs to an industry classified as having a low R&D-intensity. 
A distinction between firms  in  high- versus low-tech sectors can be important. Firms which are 
active  in  a  high  tech  sector  can  be  expected  to  be  R&D-active.  If they  do  not  disclose  any 
information, it might be considered as  a negative signal.  For an  R&D-active firm in a low  tech 
sector however, keeping these activities proprietary may be more important. 
Some of the R&D-variables, especially those which are related, one way or another, with 
the success of R&D, will probably also have an impact on the decision to capitalize. Basically, we 
expect  that  firms  are  more  likely  to  capitalize  when  their  R&D-activities  are  successful. 
Respecting the General Accepted Accounting Principles, expenses can only be capitalized when 
they contribute to future earnings. Current R&D expenses generate future earnings when the R&D 
activities are expected to payoff in the future. As  we do not possess output related measures for 
the success of R&D (e.g. number of patents per million Belgian francs of sales), proxies have to be 
used. Holthausen et al. (1995) uses the ratio R&D-expenses to sales and the number of employees 
in  the  R&D-department  to  measure  innovative  performance.  We  expect  the  level  of R&D-
expenses, both in absolute as in relative terms as well as the number of R&D-personnel to have a 
positive impact on the probability of capitalization. The idea is  that large R&D-investments can 
only be justified when they have a positive impact on the results of the firm in the future.  The 
questionnaire provides additional information on "the production of innovation expenses" and "the 
expenditures for licenses", be it that the  quality of this  information is  low.  If the research and 
development activities are successful, a production phase of the innovation follows. Therefore, as 
the amount spent in the production phase is larger, the R&D-activities are more successful. Based 
on the same idea, we  expect firms  which spent a larger percentage of their R&D-investments on 
research as compared to development activities, to capitalize less. The reason is that for research 
expenses, the contribution to earnings is less certain as compared to development expenditures. 
Finally, Young et al.  (1994) stipulate that partnerships with firms  and a separate R&D-
department encourage the efficiency of R&D-activities,  which can  result in  an  increase of the 
expected revenues and success. We therefore expect that firms with an R&D-department and firms 
involved in an R&D-cooperation agreement are also more likely to capitalize their R&D-expenses. 
4.3 The size of  the firm 
A final hypothesis is related to the size of the firm,  measured in terms of total assets, turnover or 
the  number of employees,  as  a control  variable.  Following  the  transaction  costs  literature,  the 
incentive for private acquisition information is higher in large firms which makes disclosure more Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  11 
likely  (Lev  et  al.  (1990),  Lang  et al.  (1993».  On  the  other hand,  using  a  political  visibility 
argument,  larger  firms  may  prefer  not  to  capitalize  their  R&D-expenses  in  order  to  avoid 
regulatory actions  from the  government.  Therefore,  we  expect that  larger firms  have  a  higher 
probability  to  disclose  their  R&D-expenses  but  a  lower  probability  to  capitalize  their  R&D-
expenses. 
Table 1 : List of  variables and hypotheses 
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9The  variable  'finhealth'  equals  1 when the net worth,  defined as  (long term debt+equity-fixed assets),  is 
larger than zero. 
IOThe variable 'stake' equals 1 when the owners or the debt holders are satisfied with the current performance 
of the firm. This situation occurs when the return on equity >8% and/or the operational cash flow is positive. 
liThe variable 'profgrowth' equals (Profits 93-Profits 92)1absolute value (profits 93). Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  12 
The variables used and their expected impact on the disclosure and capitalization 
decision are summarized in Table 1. The table shows the different expectations for the influence of 
the "accounting" as opposed to the "R&D" variables on the disclosure and capitalization decision. 
While we expect that the accounting variables will have an influence on the disclosure as  well as 
on the capitalization decision, the R&D-characteristics mainly determine the disclosure decision. If 
the indicated R&D-variables determine the capitalization decision,  the  reporting decision could 
give  information about the expected success of the R&D-activities. However, one definitely needs 
to take into account the limitations of input related variables to measure the success of R&D. 
5. Empirical Results 
The paper aims to identify the circumstances which explain a firm's  decision whether or not to 
disclose its  R&D-expenses and  if disclosed,  whether these expenditures  are  capitalized or not. 
Both  the  disclosure  and  the  capitalization  decision  are  considered  as  O/1-decisionsI2.  In  what 
follows we will report on a logit-model estimating the probability of R&D-active firms to disclose 
and  capitalize  their R&D-expenses.  The choice of the  explanatory  variables  was  based on  an 
exploration  of the  related  literature  as  well  as  on  the  available  data.  The  results  from  non-
parametric one-way tests are reported in section 5.1. While such a univariate test-procedure may 
give  some first impressions of the driving factors,  the  different explanatory factors  need to  be 
considered together in econometric analysis, reported in section 5.2. 
5.1. Non-parametric univariate test results 
First we will discuss a number of "accounting" variables. Subsequently we look at variables which 
describe the R&D-profile of the firms  involved. Finally, we will look at the impact of the size of 
the firm.  To avoid mixing disclosure and capitalization decisions, only the disclosers are part of 
the sample when studying the capitalization decision.  This seriously reduces the effective sample 
for the capitalization decision, and may limit reaching significant results. Whenever relevant, the 
variables were corrected for the influence of the reporting choice made13. 
As  financial  variables  are  not  normally  distributed,  a  non-parametric  test,  the 
vanderwaerdentest, is used. This test computes the deviation from the mean score. 
12  In the paper we won't pay attention to the amount or the percentage of their R&D-expenses firms disclose 
and/or capitalise. 
13 If a firm capitalises its R&D-expenditures for example, total assets are equal to (total assets - (amount of 
R&D capitalised - amount of R&D depreciated in the current year)). Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  13 
a.  accounting variables 
The performance of the fIrm is  a highly signifIcant variable to  distinguish between firms  which 
disclose their R&D-expenses and those which do not (see Table 2). Like stated in our hypothesis, 
fIrms which disclose perform worse: they have a lower current ratio, a higher debt-equity ratio and 
a lower return on assets and on equity, their stakeholders are more dissatisfIed in the current year 
and they may not be able to reimburse their short term debts. While the fInancial performance does 
influence the decision to disclose, it does not discriminate signifIcantly between capitalisers and 
non-capitalisers. 
The univariate test shows that an increase in the income compared to the previous year is 
an incentive to disclose R&D information, contrary to what we expected. This could indicate that 
the  success of R&D,  measured by the influence on profIts,  determines the disclosure of R&D-
expenses. However, the change in profIts does not determine the capitalization decision. 
Table 2:  Univariate test results - accounting variables 
Variable (D=Dummy)  Disci  NonDiscl  P-value  Cap  Non Cap  P-value 
current ratio  -0.2435  0.1008  0.0045  -0.0010  0.0224  0.8805 
debt/equity ratio  0.1500  -0.0622  0.0808  0.0276  -0.6414  0.6735 
return on assets  -0.2722  0.1130  0.0015  -0.0843  0.1958  0.1983 
return on equity  -0.1615  0.0671  0.0602  -0.0271  0.0628  0.6799 
finhealth (= D)  -0.1488  0.0616  0.0192  -0.0520  0.1188  0.1187 
stake (= D)  -0.1020  0.0422  0.0447  -0.070  0.1577  0.1110 
profgrowth  0.1545  -0.0641  0.0721  -0.0914  0.2121  0.1629 
b. R&D variables 
Besides the size of the fIrms involved and a number of "accounting" variables, the R&D-profIle of 
the fIrms involved may also influence the reporting decision (see Table 3). The impact of this type 
of variables  has  never been studied before.  In what follows  we report on the  signifIcance of a 
series of variables which describe the R&D-profIle of the fIrms in the sample. 
Variables describing the absolute as  well as  the relative importance of the R&D-activities 
tum out to be highly signifIcant when distinguishing between disclosers and non disclosers. Like 
we  expected, fIrms  which disclose their R&D-expenditures  spend more on R&D,  in absolute as 
well  as  in relative  terms  and  also  employ  more  R&D  personnel.  However,  as  the  interaction 
variables with R&D intensive industries show, the R&D intensity of the fIrm only discriminates Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  14 
between  disclosers  and  non-disclosers  in  R&D  intensive  industries.  Except  for  the  relative 
measure,  these  variables  can  also  distinguish between  capitalisers  and  non-capitalisers  : firms 
which  spend more  on  R&D  and/or have  a  high  number  of R&D-personnel  are  more  likely  to 
capitalize their R&D-expenses. 
Table 3 : univariate test results - R&D variables 
Variable (D=Dummy)  Discl  NonDiscl  P-value  Cap  Non Cap  P-value 
R&D-expenditures  0.4706  -0.1948  0.0001  0.1381  -0.3096  0.0373 
R&D-personnel  0.4415  -0.2102  0.0001  0.1922  -0.3773  0.0122 
R&D-expenditures/sales  0.3164  -0.1310  0.0002  0.0897  -0.2009  0.1764 
R&D-subsidies  -0.0234  0.0056  0.9154  0.0194  -0.0434  0.6403 
Research oriented (%)  -0.0439  0.0191  0.6444  0.1212  -0.2590  0.1126 
Process oriented (%)  -0.043  0.017  0.6443  -0.056  0.1032  0.4821 
Intra muros (%)  -0.0905  0.0405  0.2396  0.0030  -0.0081  0.9546 
R&D-dep (= D)  0.2089  -0.0865  0.0021  0.0142  -0.0064  0.9056 
R&D-coop (= D)  0.2484  -0.1029  0.0002  0.0982  -0.0043  0.9264 
R&Dint(H)  0.2082  -0.0862  0.0069  0.0566  -0.1268  0.3614 
R&Dint(L)  0.01636  -0.0056  0.8562  0.0399  -0.1780  0.7550 
Production of innovation  0.0037  -0.0079  0.9212  0.0996  -0.2380  0.0941 
expenses 
Expenses for licenses  0.2297  -0.1069  0.0011  -0.0510  0.1219  0.4081 
However,  the  amount  of  R&D-subsidies  received  from  EC-,  Belgian  or  Flemish 
government sources is not significantly different between disclosers and non-disclosers. The same 
is true with respect to the focus of the R&D-activities: the percentage of R&D expenses spent on 
research activities  or on  the  development  of new  processes  is  also  not  significantly  different 
between disclosers and non-disclosers, capitalisers and non-capitalisers. 
Firms which disclose do not significantly outsource more their R&D-activities, but they 
are  significantly more likely to  have a  separate R&D-department,  and to  be  involved  in R&D-
cooperation agreements. None of these variables is  significant to distinguish between capitalisers 
and non-capitalisers however. 
We  argued  that  firms  which  are  more  successful  are  more  likely  to  capitalize  their 
expenditures  although  this  hypothesis  could  also  be  reversed.  It  turns  out  that  firms  which 
capitalize spend more on the production of innovations but the expenditures for  licenses are not 
significant for the capitalization decision while they are highly significant to distinguish between 
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an R&D-cooperation agreement are also not significant at all to distinguish between capitalisers 
and non-capitalisers. 
c. the size of the firm 
The relationship between the size of the firm, measured in terms of total assets, turnover or by the 
number of employees, and the disclosure decision is as expected: larger firms significantly disclose 
more (see Table 4).  Only the number of employees discriminates between capitalisers and non-
capitalisers. 
Table 4 : univariate test results - size of  the firm 
Variable  Discl  NonDiscl  P-value  Cap  NonCap  P-value 
total assets  0.3888  -0.1610  0.0001  0.0537  -0.1203  0.4185 
turnover  0.2406  -0.0919  0.0049  0.0287  -0.0642  0.6661 
number of employees  0.3322  -0.1375  0.0001  0.1122  -0.2515  0.0909 
While it is  difficult to draw general conclusions from these results, they seem to suggest 
that the disclosure and the capitalization decision are distinct decisions that cannot be explained 
using the same variables and that variables related with the R&D-profile of the firm need to be 
taken into account. These conclusions need to be confirmed in a multivariate econometric analysis. 
In the next paragraph we therefore report on the results of a Logit model estimation. 
5.2.  Logit Estimations 
a. the model 
Since we considered the disclosure as  well as  the  capitalization decision as  (0,1) decisions, we 
used  a  logit  estimation  procedure  to  estimate  the  probability  of disclosure  and  capitalization 
respectively. Many of the variables used in the univariate test procedure are highly correlated and 
could not all be included in the multivariate analysis.  The following expressions resulted in the 
most significant parameter estimates : 
P(disclosure = 1) = c + a1R&Dint(H) + a2R&Dint(L) + a3R&Ddep + a~&Dcoop  + a5size 
+ Cl{jfinhealth + a7stake + a8profgrowth Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  16 
Since one of our basic research questions is to know whether or not the same variables explain the 
disclosure and the capitalization decision, we deliberately used the same set of variables in both 
equations: 
P(capitalization = 1) =  c + a1R&Dint(H) + a 2R&Dint(L) + a 3R&Ddep + C4R&Dcoop + 
assize + CXt;finhealth + a7stake + agprofgrowth 
b. results 
The  empirical  results  are  based  on  317  observations  for  which  all  response  and  explanatory 
variables were available. The results for the Logit estimation are given in Table 5.  Note that we 
estimated the probability that a firm discloses  its  R&D-expenditures.  Variables with a  positive 
parameter estimate therefore  have  a  positive  impact on  the  probability  of disclosure.  We  will 
discuss the impact of the different variables, starting with the most significant one. The introduced 
independent variables certainly explain part of the disclosure decision as the overall p-value of the 
model (=0.0001) is highly significant. 
As  the univariate  test results  already  suggested,  the  size of a  firm turns  out to  be  an 
important variable influencing a firm's  decision to  disclose its  R&D-expenditures.  Bigger firms 
have a significantly higher probability to disclose their R&D-expenditures, which further confirms 
our size-hypothesis. 
Table 5: Logit estimation results for the decision to disclose 
variable  parameter estimate  standard error  Prob > Chi-square 
intercept  -4.2036  1.0597  0.0001 
R&Dint(H)  0.0253  0.0130  0.0522 
R&Dint(L)  0.0053  0.0058  0.3591 
R&Ddep  0.4766  0.2726  0.0804 
R&Dcoop  0.5164  0.3146  0.1007 
size  0.2212  0.0768  0.0040 
finhealth  -0.5957  0.2988  0.0462 
stake  -0.8916  0.4123  0.0306 
profgrowth  0.0013  0.0091  0.8846 
Another significant variable, which supports one of our hypotheses, is the performance of 
the  firms  in  the eyes  of the  stakeholders  of the firm,  more  precisely the  shareholders  and  the 
creditors. If both these parties are dissatisfied with the performance of the firm (in the way  we Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  17 
specified before), chances are higher that this firm will disclose its R&D-expenditures. Finns may 
do this in order to explain their bad performance to their shareholders and creditors. The idea is 
that because of their R&D-expenses, they performed badly.  By disclosing these R&D-expenses, 
the firm wants to convince the stakeholders that the performance of the firm will improve in the 
future when the R&D investments payoff. 
Firms  which  are  financially  healthy  have  a  lower  probability  to  disclose  their  R&D-
expenditures. This result can be explained along similar veins as  for the "stake"-variable. Firms 
which are financially healthy have no problems to repay their debt and therefore no need to justify 
their performance vis  a vis  their creditors. However, if the sum of the equity of the firm and its 
long term debt is  smaller than its fixed assets, problems may arise to repay the debts and the firm 
may try to explain this lack of financial means by disclosing its R&D-expenditures.  In addition, 
financially healthy firms have a lower need for external funding and hence need to signal less their 
success by disclosing. 
The R&D-intensity of the firm also positively influences the probability that a firm will 
disclose its R&D-expenditures, at least for those firms  which belong to a sector we classified as 
being R&D intensive. This may be explained by the fact that when R&D is an important activity 
for firms, there is less need to hide this activity. In low R&D-intensive sectors, the R&D-intensity 
has no significant effect. 
Firms with a separate R&D-department as  well as  firms  which are involved in  a R&D-
cooperation agreement have a higher probability to disclose their R&D investments, although the 
parameter estimates for these variables are only significant at the 8 and 10 %-level respectively 14, 
The R&D-activities of a firm with a separate R&D-department can be considered to have a more 
permanent character and to stress their importance, firms may want to disclose their expenditures. 
The  information  on  being  R&D  active  is  already  more  public  for  these  firms,  reducing  the 
information costs  from  disclosing.  In addition,  the  disclosure  of their  R&D-expenditures  may 
support the credibility of firms which are partner in a R&D-cooperation agreement. 
Finally,  the  decision  to  disclose  its  R&D-expenditures  in  1993  isn't  influenced  by  the 
growth rate of a firm's profits between 1992 and 1993. 
We now tum to a discussion of the results for the capitalization decision. The first results 
which we will discuss are only based on the sample of firms which disclosed their R&D-expenses, 
i.e.  94 firms  of which  65  firms  capitalized  their  R&D-expenses.  The overall  logit  estimation 
deteriorates  (p=O.0622)  and  only  a  few  parameter  estimates  are  significant  at  a  10  %  level, 
14  Making a difference between cooperation within the group or with outside partners (research institutes or 
other firms)  has  no  impact on the results.  Contrary to  what  we  expect, cooperation within  the  group  also 
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probably because this sample is  too  small (see also the  significance of the nonparametric tests). 
We will therefore also report the results based on a larger sample of firms in which we considered 
as  "non-capitalisers"  not only  the  firms  which disclosed  their R&D-expenditures  but expensed 
them,  but also all firms  which didn't disclose their R&D-expenditures. This procedure allows to 
increase the number of observations but has the important disadvantage that we cannot distinguish 
between the factors which drive the decision to capitalize or not from the decision to disclose or 
not.  However, by confronting these results with the supra reported disclosure results we can still 
single out some interesting results on the difference between disclosure and capitalization. 
In some countries for instance, the disclosure of R&D expenses is required and disclosure 
is  no  longer a decision variable for  the  firm.  It  is  therefore interesting to  directly compare the 
group of capitalizing firms with the group of expensing firms, both disclosing and non-disclosing 
firms.  This  also  allows  a  comparison  with  other  empirical  studies  not  distinguishing  the 
capitalization  from the  disclosure  decision.  Comparing  the  results  from  capitalisers  with  non-
capitalisers is also important with respect to the ungoing debate whether the capitalization of R&D 
expenses is information relevant. 
Table 6: Logit estimations for the decision to capitalize (small sample) 
variable  parameter estimate  standard error  Prob > Chi-square 
intercept  0.587  1.9931  0.7683 
R&Dint(H)  0.0272  0.0286  0.3411 
R&Dint(L)  0.0098  0.0252  0.6986 
R&Ddep  -0.2130  0.5174  0.6806 
R&Dcoop  -0.1792  0.6885  0.7946 
size  0.0608  0.1424  0.6696 
finhealth  -0.9587  0.5701  0.0926 
stake  -1.4765  0.8527  0.0834 
profgrowth  -0.1549  0.0987  0.1167 
None of the  "R&D"-variables has  a significant impact on the probability to capitalize. Only the 
"accounting"  variables  finhealth  and  stake,  both  related  to  the  performance  of the  firm,  are 
significant,  though  only  at  10  %.  Like  we  expected,  if the  shareholders  and the  creditors  are 
dissatisfied with the  performance of the firm in  the  way  we  specified before, the probability of 
capitalization increases. If a firm has a positive net worth (the dummy-variable "finhealth" gets the 
value 1),  it  will capitalize her R&D-expenditures with a lower probability as  compared to a firm 
which may not be able to repay her debts. An insufficiently high income for the owners and the 
debt  holders  favors  the  capitalization  of the  R&D  expenses.  Finally,  although  the  variable Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  19 
profgrowth (p=0.1167)  is  not highly significant,  it contributes to the overall significance of the 
model. If it is deleted, the p-value of the model drops to 0.1934. 
Overall, the results based on this  limited sample are weak. But this negative conclusion 
does not reject the idea that the disclosure and the capitalization decision are driven by different 
factors  and  therefore  firms  not  only  disclose  their  R&D-expenditures  in  order  to  be  able  to 
capitalize  them.  In order  to  further  zero  in  on  the  factors  which  are  of major  importance  in 
explaining the disclosure versus the capitalization decision, we now report on the results based on 
the extended sample, including as non-capitalizers, both disclosing and non-disclosing firms  (see 
Table 7).  Compared to  the restricted capitalization model, the p-value of the model significantly 
improves (p=O.OOOl). 
The size variable is  significant and its impact is  similar to  the one we discussed for the 
case of the  disclosure decision:  larger firms  have a higher probability to  capitalize their R&D-
expenditures. This contradicts the finding of Daley and Vigeland (1983) for the situation in the US 
before 1974.  The same is true for the variable which refers to the financial health of the firm.  A 
firm which has no problems to repay her debt (the dummy-variable "finhealth" gets the value  1) 
will capitalize her R&D-expenditures with a lower probability as  compared to a firm which may 
not be able to repay her debts, similarly to what we found in the small sample. If the firm can not 
supply a sufficiently high income to  the stake holders, the firm is  more likely to capitalize the 
R&D expenses. 
Table 7:  Logit estimations for the decision to capitalize (extended sample) 
variable  parameter estimate  standard error  Prob> Chi-square 
intercept  -4.7946  1.1973  0.0001 
R&Dint(H)  0.0295  0.0139  0.0334 
R&Dint(L)  0.0073  0.0069  0.2901 
R&Ddep  0.3485  0.3113  0.2629 
R&Dcoop  0.3359  0.3658  0.3585 
size  0.2436  0.0863  0.0047 
finhealth  -0.8369  0.3322  0.0118 
stake  1.2722  0.4352  0.0035 
profgrowth  -0.0129  0.0167  0.4385 
With respect to the impact of the "R&D"-variables,  the R&D-intensity of the firms which 
we  classified to  be part of a R&D-intensive  sector has  a positive impact on the  probability of 
capitalization. The other two R&D-variables, R&Dcoop and R&Ddep,  which were significant in 
explaining the disclosure decision, do not significantly influence the probability of capitalization. Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  20 
c. extensions 
In this final paragraph we  want to present the results of some extensions to the basic model, we 
discussed before. 
The R&D profile as well as the financial performance of the firm determine the decision to 
disclose. However, once the firm decides  to  disclose, only financial  performance influences the 
capitalization decision.  This  is  also  confirmed by  the  results  we  get  when  we  leave  the  R&D 
variables out of the equation. The financial variables (finhealth, stake and profgrowth) all become 
significant at a 10% level and the overall p-value reaches the level of 0.0076. 
Comparing  the  group  of capitalizing  firms  to  the  group  of expensing  firms,  whether 
disclosing or not,  the results  indicate that next to  the financial  performance the R&D intensity 
influences the decision to capitalize, while the existence of cooperation and an R&D department 
are  insignificant.  If we  only  introduce  the  financial  variables,  the  overall  significance  slightly 
decreases (0.0004 instead of 0.0001), which demonstrates the importance of the R&D profile when 
the capitalizing and non-capitalizing firms  (disclosing and non-disclosing firms) are compared. If 
we consider the R&D  intensity,  although an  input related measure of innovative behavior, as  a 
proxy  for  successful  R&D  activities,  the  results  show  that  the  expenses  are  only  put  on  the 
balances sheet when they contribute to future earnings. 
To further zero in on the correlation between the contribution to future earnings and the 
registration  as  an  asset,  the  total  amount  of R&D  expenses  is  split  up  in  two  parts:  research 
expenses and development expenses. As development expenses can result in revenues in a shorter 
time period, the probability of capitalization is expected to be larger. When the R&D intensity is 
replaced by the development intensity (development expenses/sales), the results of the three basic 
models remain the same. As  the development expenses increase, disclosure becomes more likely 
(p=0.0851) and all  the  other variables  of the basic  model remain significant.  The development 
expenses do not influence the capitalization decision for the small sample, while they do for the 
extended sample (p=0.0475). 
When the research intensity (research expenses/sales) is  introduced, it does not influence 
the  disclosure nor the capitalization decision  15.  The analysis  of the  development and  research 
intensity shows that the R&D expenses are only capitalized when they are expected to result in an 
increase in revenues in the near future. We also tested the influence of innovation expenses as  a 
measure of successful R&D output.  We found that the  variable "innovation expenses" does not 
discriminate  neither  between  disclosers  and  non-disclosers  nor  between  capitalisers  and  non-
capitalisers. However, it should be mentioned that this information was only available for 192 out 
15 Both variables, the research intensity and the development intensity could not be introduced simultaneously 
because of correlation problems between those two variables. Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  21 
of the 321 firms. Another measure of R&D are the expenses for licenses. We extended the model 
with a dummy variable indicating the presence of such licensing expenses. The evidence shows 
that the existence of those expenses encourages finns to disclose their R&D-expenses (p=O.0534), 
but they don't have a significant impact on the probability of capitalization  (p=0.3865). As the 
percentage  of R&D  spent  to  product  innovation  increases,  disclosure  becomes  more  likely 
(p=O.0595), but it does not influence the capitalization decision. An explanation could be that the 
revenues from product innovation are more identifiable than those from process innovation. 
Further extending the model with a variable indicating the outsourcing of R&D-activities 
does not result in a significant parameter estimate for this variable for the disclosure decision nor 
for  the  capitalization  decision.  Again,  these  results  are  probably  distorted  by  the  limited 
availability of data (274 out of 321).  Similarly,  including a  variable related  to  the  granting of 
subsidies didn't result in significant parameter estimates. 
Given the existence of an R&D  department,  the percentage of R&D  spent in the  R&D 
department, was  also introduced in the analysis  16.  With a given amount of R&D expenses, we 
expected  the  chance of disclosure  to  increase  when  more  expenses  are  done  within  the  R&D 
department since those costs -can be easier identified. The results confinn this hypothesis for the 
disclosure decision (p=O.0509) but not for the capitalization decision. 
The influence of changes in the R&D-level (93-92)  on the disclosure and capitalization 
decision, was also tested. But the change in the R&D-level, as absolute number or as a dummy, has 
no significant impact on the disclosure or the capitalization decision.  We also checked whether 
the  finns  involved  disclosed  and  capitalized  their  R&D  expenses  for  tax  reasons.  When  the 
financial statements are also used for tax purposes, finns will more likely to expense their R&D 
costs (Bhagat et al.  (1995». But our empirical results show that the tax rate can not discriminate 
between  disclosers,  capitalisers,  non-disclosers  and  non-capitalisers.  When  a  dummy  variable 
(dtax=l  if taxes  are  paid),  is  introduced,  a  positive  tax  rate  discourages  firms  to  disclose 
infonnation (p=O.0321) but it does not influence the capitalization decision even if the group of 
capitalisers is compared to all the other finns. 
Finally,  an  R&D  diversification  measure,  the  percentage  of R&D  spent  in  the  basic 
industry, is added to the disclosure model 17. We expected that competitive reasons limit disclosure 
when the firm has R&D activities in other sectors. The results confinn this hypothesis (p=O.0069). 
16 116 firms in the sample have an R&D department, 37 of those firms have R&D activities outside the R&D 
department. The percentage spent outside the R&D department varies between 9% and 96 %. 
17 In the sample 37 firms have R&D activities in other industries than the basic industry. The percentage spent 
in other industries varies between 2 and 55% of the total R&D expenses. Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  22 
5. Conclusions 
The accounting rules in Europe, contrary to those in the US, allow firms to capitalize their R&D-
expenses.  Because of the presumed potential impact of this  legal opportunity on the innovative 
activities  of firms,  the  question  which  factors  have  an  impact on  this  decision definitely is  an 
interesting and important one. This paper tried to tackle this relatively unexplored question in the 
literature. The aim was more precisely to get an idea of the factors which have an influence, first, 
on  the  firm's  decision  to  disclose its  R&D-expenditures  and,  second,  on  the  firms  decision  to 
(partly) capitalize its  disclosed expenditures as opposed to the decision to expense them fully.  A 
unique  combination  of  two  data-sources  could  be  used.  For  321  innovative  Flemish  firms 
information  concerning  their  R&D-expenditures  and  -behaviour  could  be  mapped  with  the 
information in the financial statements of these firms. 
With respect to the disclosure decision, several significant variables could be identified. 
Larger  firms  with  dissatisfied  shareholders  and  creditors,  which  have  problems  to  repay  their 
debts,  which have a high R&D intensity -at least for firms  in R&D-intensive sectors,  a separate 
R&D-department  and  which  are  involved  in  a  R&D-cooperation  agreement  have  the  highest 
probability of disclosure. 
Once the firm decides to disclose the amount of R&D, mainly the accounting variables are 
significant  in  explaining  the  capitalization decision:  the  position of the  stake-holders,  and  the 
financial health of the firm. 
The  results  reported  here  can  be  of relevance  for  countries,  debating  whether  the 
registration as  an  asset in the balance sheet should be allowed. When the  group of capitalizing 
firms are compared to expensing firms, whether disclosing or not, our results suggest that the R&D 
intensity,  at  least  in  highly innovative  industries,  and  the  financial  performance determine  the 
capitalization of R&D expenses. Although this input related measure of innovative capacity has its 
limitations,  the  results  suggest that  the  expenses  of successful  R&D  activities  are  more  likely 
capitalized as  an  asset in the  balance  sheet.  This  is  further  strengthened by differentiating the 
Research  from  the  Development  expenditures.  With  only  the  latter  significantly  influencing 
disclosure and capitalization, only innovative activities related to  well defined projects with not 
too much risk are considered to be investments:  The more basic and general exploratory research 
is rather considered to be a necessary overhead cost of doing business. 
In  order  to  check  the  robustness  of the  empirical  results  presented  in  this  paper,  a 
replication, if possible in different countries, on a larger dataset with longer time series and better 
variables is needed.  The results mainly have their importance in stimulating further research into 
explaining why  so many firms  choose not to  disclose their R&D-expenditures  and why,  if they 
disclose, don't capitalize these expenditures. Disclosure and Capitalisation of  R&D Expenses  23 
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